On September 8, 2026, LIV Golf New Jersey LLC and 56 affiliates filed Chapter 11 petitions in the District of New Jersey, where the cases are assigned to Judge Michael B. Kaplan. The filing came four months after the Public Investment Fund of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (PIF), which had funded the league since 2021, announced it would stop.

The debtors entered the case with roughly $15 million of cash, a secured PIF facility of approximately $495 million and a restructuring support agreement signed with BC Partners Advisors L.P. on the petition date. That agreement contemplates a $300 million investment in a reorganized company in which players who sign on would own 52.5% of the common equity. PIF's debt and equity would be cancelled in exchange for releases. If the transaction fails within the DIP timeline, the fallback is a liquidating plan.

Three weeks in, the docket shows the early DIP milestones met and the plan milestones still ahead. It shows no motion to assume the RSA, although the RSA called for one within three days of filing. On September 29 the debtors told the court they were still negotiating with PIF and BC Partners over LIV 2.0 and expected "further clarity on their path forward in the near term" (Dkt. 171 ¶¶ 5–6). A creditors' committee was appointed the next day. Press reports through September 30 describe several of the league's largest player creditors as undecided.

LIV Golf launched operations in March 2022. By the petition date it ran a 14-event season with 57 contracted golfers, 52 of them on 13 four-player teams and five competing as wild cards (Dkt. 27 ¶¶ 4, 16, 21). The first day declaration organizes the business into two segments. The League entities, LIV Golf Incorporated for the United States and LIV Golf Ltd. internationally, own the events, ticketing, broadcast and league sponsorship rights. Thirteen team entities sell their own sponsorships and generated about 20% of 2025 revenue (Dkt. 27 ¶¶ 22–23).

The compensation model is what separated LIV from the established tours, and it is what made the company expensive to run. Players received guaranteed up-front "commitment" payments and annual payments, team equity in some cases, and prize money, and in exchange granted sponsorship and, for some, name, image and likeness rights to the league and its teams (Dkt. 27 ¶ 20). Those contracts generally run through the 2028 season (Dkt. 24 ¶ 10(d)).

The revenue line was growing. Sponsorship rose from about $16 million in 2023 to $102 million in 2025, and the company reports roughly $300 million of contracted sponsorship for 2027 through 2029. Comparable-event attendance through June 2026 was up about 31% year over year, with ticketing, hospitality and food and beverage revenue up 43% (Dkt. 27 ¶¶ 25, 27). Broadcast rights, the largest revenue source for most professional leagues, contributed 5%.

None of that covered the cost base. The declaration reports approximately $5 billion of cumulative net operating losses through December 31, 2025, about $3.0 billion at LIV Golf Inc. and about $2 billion at LIV Golf Ltd. (Dkt. 27 ¶ 42). Those NOLs are now described as among the debtors' most valuable assets, and the proposed transaction is built around preserving them.

Until June 2026 LIV had no funded debt. PIF-controlled entities supplied approximately $5 billion of equity, and the company's largest liabilities were long-dated unsecured player contracts and vendor obligations (Dkt. 27 ¶¶ 36–37, 41). That changed on June 4, 2026, when LIV Golf Holdings borrowed from PIF under a secured facility guaranteed by the principal operating and IP-holding entities. Additional subsidiaries, including the lead debtor and LIV Golf Events Ltd., acceded as guarantors on August 27 and 28. By the petition date the balance, including interest, was approximately $495 million, secured by substantially all assets of the borrower and guarantors (Dkt. 27 ¶ 39).

The ownership chart runs from two Jersey holding companies, LIV Golf Investments Ltd. and LIV Golf Holdings Ltd., through LIV Golf Incorporated (Delaware), which owns the U.S. event entities, the team entities and two IP-holding companies, and also owns LIV Golf Ltd. (England), which holds the international events business. The Jersey parents are also in a coordinated administration in Jersey, and two U.K. entities filed for recognition in the United Kingdom (Dkt. 27 ¶¶ 30–33).

One prepetition step deserves attention from anyone modeling recoveries. Before August 24, 2026, all but two teams were partly player-owned, with individual players holding up to 40% (more commonly 25%) of team common equity. On that date the team structures were merged in a way that cancelled the player and sponsor equity holdings; the last team was consolidated on the petition date. The declaration states the purpose was to preserve the NOLs (Dkt. 27 ¶ 35 & n.6).

The declaration ties the filing to a single decision. On April 30, 2026, PIF announced it would not provide the equity needed to reach profitability, citing a change in "the current phase of PIF's investment strategy," and committed only to fund the rest of the 2026 season through a secured facility (Dkt. 27 ¶¶ 8, 43). The company says it believed its model would have reached profitability in five to seven years with continued funding (Dkt. 27 ¶ 42).

The governance and advisory work started before that announcement. Independent directors were seated on April 13, and a Strategic Initiative Committee of those directors was formed on April 24 with exclusive authority over conflict matters and any restructuring transaction. With Kobre & Kim as independent counsel, the committee began investigating potential claims against insiders and affiliates, an investigation that remains open and that conditions the company's release of PIF under the term sheet (Dkt. 27 ¶¶ 45–47; Ex. C, Term Sheet at 6).

The operating cuts came alongside the process. The company reduced fan-experience programming and hospitality, curtailed travel and lodging, scaled back player accommodations and cancelled two tournaments (Dkt. 27 ¶¶ 52–53). The DIP market test produced no third-party lender. Each of the twelve institutions Ducera approached in August cited the position any new money would occupy behind PIF's secured claim and insufficient collateral value (Dkt. 22 ¶ 6). PIF was left as the only available DIP source.

The BC Partners term sheet, attached to the RSA as Exhibit C to the first day declaration, describes a recapitalization of LIV Golf Incorporated ("LIV Holdco"), the entity that holds the NOLs, with LIV 2.0 and a team holding company operating beneath it. The debtors' motions describe LIV 2.0 as a go-forward league "under the new ownership of the Players and the lead investor" (Dkt. 24 ¶ 7).

Players who agree to play in LIV 2.0 would receive, on account of their allowed claims and subject to mutual releases and settlement agreements, equity sized to qualify the transaction under Section 382(l)(5) of the Internal Revenue Code. Amended player contracts would carry signing bonuses, the return of certain NIL rights and, on average, about 30% player ownership of the teams (Ex. C at 1–2). Team-sale proceeds would be split 30% to players and 70% to LIV 2.0, with the LIV 2.0 share subject to a term-loan cash sweep of 25% to 50% (Ex. C at 6).

PIF would walk away with nothing. Its funded debt and equity would be "cancelled and extinguished in exchange for releases with no economic distribution," and PIF would release all claims against the company. The company's release of PIF is expressly subject to the Strategic Initiative Committee's independent investigation (Ex. C at 2, 6). The investors also negotiated two upside features: the right to buy one LIV 2.0 expansion team for $1 within ten years of closing, and 2% of LIV 2.0 revenue for seven years once the league reaches profitability (Ex. C at 4).

Closing conditions include a KPMG tax opinion on Section 382(l)(5), affirmations from major sponsors that they will honor their contracts, executed player contracts consistent with the LIV 2.0 business plan "that include players required by the Investors," and a confirmation order. The debtors must also continue an active trade or business through the case (Ex. C at 4). The RSA carries a break fee of 3% of BC Partners' total investment, payable only from an alternative transaction (Dkt. 27 ¶ 63).

If BC Partners' transaction cannot be completed on the DIP timeline, the plan would instead provide for an orderly wind-down through a liquidating trust funded in part by a cash contribution from PIF for holders of allowed general unsecured claims (Dkt. 22 ¶ 1). The debtors call either path the "Approved Plan."

PIF, as prepetition lender, consented to being primed by its own DIP. The facility is a senior secured superpriority term loan of up to $49.6 million: a $14 million interim draw and a single delayed draw after the final order, no later than 35 days after filing. Loans bear 12% PIK interest and mature 120 days after the petition date. Each dollar drawn rolls up a dollar of prepetition PIF debt into DIP obligations (Dkt. 22 ¶¶ 1–4).

Liquidity controls are tight. All proceeds sit in a blocked account under PIF's control and are released weekly only to the extent projected unrestricted cash would otherwise fall below $5 million. Operating disbursements may not exceed the approved 13-week budget by more than the greater of 10% or $200,000 on a cumulative basis. Professional fees after a carve-out trigger notice are capped at $4.5 million (Dkt. 22 at 12, 15, 18). A milestone default triggers a seven-day notice period before PIF may exercise remedies (Dkt. 22 at 17).

The interim order adopts the DIP credit agreement's milestones by reference and does not modify them (Dkt. 79 ¶ 8). Two of the outer deadlines fall on a holiday and a weekend: the disclosure statement order is due the day after Thanksgiving and the confirmation order on a Sunday.

The first day declaration lists four RSA milestones (Dkt. 27 ¶ 62). The first three were due within ten days of filing. None of them is reflected on the docket.

The absence is consistent with milestones that have been extended or waived off the docket. The RSA allows exactly that: each milestone applies "unless extended or waived in writing (email being sufficient) by the Plan Sponsor," which is BC Partners (Dkt. 27, Ex. C, RSA § 4). The RSA also required PIF to become a party by the assumption deadline, on terms acceptable to BC Partners "in their sole and absolute discretion" (RSA § 4(e)), and no PIF joinder appears on the docket. The debtors' own filings point that way. In opposing an expedited hearing for a venue creditor on September 29, the debtors described the cases as "on a tight timeline dictated by the DIP Loan and BC Partners RSA" and said they were "negotiating with their DIP Lender and BC Partners with respect to a go-forward LIV 2.0" (Dkt. 171 ¶¶ 5–6). That description treats the RSA as live and the commercial terms as still open, three weeks after signing.

The first day hearing was held by Zoom on September 9, and Judge Kaplan granted each of the first day motions heard that day, including the DIP motion, with the first omnibus rejection motion held for October 7 (Dkt. 28; minute entries Sept. 9). Orders entered the next day covered cash management, wages, taxes, insurance, utilities, foreign vendors and lien claimants, the appointment of Omni Agent Solutions as claims and noticing agent, appointment of a foreign representative for the foreign proceedings, and notice-and-hearing procedures for claims transfers designed to protect the NOLs (Dkt. 62–79). The deadline for schedules was extended to October 22 (Dkt. 76).

Contract rejections and the first objections

The first omnibus rejection motion (Dkt. 24), filed on the petition date, seeks to reject the player participation agreements, a $3 million-capped sponsor indemnification agreement with one player, player separation agreements, the West Palm Beach office lease and sublease, and a Scottsdale office membership, all effective as of the petition date. It will be heard on October 7. Two responses have been filed. One player and his affiliated entity do not oppose rejection but ask that the order also formally terminate the agreement, and expressly reserve their position on any relationship with a successor to the debtors (Dkt. 179 ¶ 1 & n.4). The law firm that subleases the West Palm Beach space asks to remain through October 31 and offers to pay October rent (Dkt. 176 ¶¶ 1–2).

The venue dispute shows how LIV 1.0 obligations press against LIV 2.0 planning. The Kooyonga Golf Club in Adelaide signed in October 2025 to host a March 18–21, 2027 event. Its first 50% installment, due July 1 and extended to September 11, was never paid. The club estimates AUD 314,250 of costs and lost opportunity from October through December while it holds the dates, and asks the court to force a decision within 30 days (Dkt. 165 ¶¶ 2–5). The debtors answered that the cases are "fully funded and are not administratively insolvent" and that they may be able to decide on the contract by the November 5 omnibus hearing (Dkt. 171 ¶¶ 4–5). The court set the motion for October 22 (Dkt. 174).

The creditors' committee

The committee appointed on September 30 is weighted toward vendors and content partners. Its members are Premier Golf League Limited, Birdie Golf, LLC, Fever Labs, Inc., NEP Supershooters, LP, Rick Shiels Media Limited, Twenty First Group Limited and Fantasy Interactive, Inc. (Dkt. 175). None of the players listed among the debtors' largest unsecured creditors was appointed. The committee will have little time: it was formed one week before the final DIP hearing and eight days before the plan filing milestone.

Most press coverage of the case restates what is in the filings. This section is limited to reporting that goes beyond the docket and bears on where the negotiations are headed. Coverage from Front Office Sports, Field Level Media and Golf.com through October 2 reports no executed player joinder, no amended BC Partners RSA, no milestone extension and no plan.

The reporting fits the debtors' own September 29 statement that terms with PIF and BC Partners are still being negotiated (Dkt. 171 ¶ 6). It also sharpens the arithmetic. The Requisite Players test is two-thirds by amount and one-half by number, so the two-thirds prong turns on a small group of the largest claims, and the public statements from that group so far run from undecided to guarded. Individual counsel for each of those players suggests they are negotiating one at a time over the terms the RSA leaves open, including signing bonuses and the player-by-player equity schedule (Ex. C, Term Sheet at 2). It may also explain the committee's makeup: a player bargaining directly with the debtors and BC Partners over his own LIV 2.0 contract has reason to stay off a fiduciary committee.

The next two weeks decide which version of the Approved Plan the debtors file.

If the players come in, the debtors would be expected to file a plan implementing the BC Partners transaction, along with an RSA assumption motion that would put the investor protections, the break fee and the $1 expansion team option in front of the court and the new committee. If they do not, the DIP milestones point to a liquidating plan funded in part by PIF, with the committee's attention turning to the size of PIF's cash contribution and the scope of the releases PIF would receive. The Strategic Initiative Committee's investigation of potential claims against insiders and affiliates bears on that release in either case.